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Death by Stereotype: Race, Ethnicity, and California’s Failure
to Implement Furman’s Narrowing Requirement
Catherine M. Grosso, Jeffrey Fagan, Michael Laurence, David Baldus (deceased),
George Woodworth, & Richard Newell

ABSTRACT
The influence of race on the administration of capital punishment had a major role in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia to invalidate death penalty statutes across
the United States. To avoid discriminatory and capricious application of capital punishment,
the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment requires legislatures to narrow the scope
of capital offenses and ensure that only the most severe crimes are subjected to the ultimate
punishment. This Article demonstrates the racial and ethnic dimensions of California’s failure
to implement this narrowing requirement. Our analysis uses a sample of 1,900 cases drawn from
27,453 California convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary
manslaughter with offense dates between January 1978 and June 2002. California’s death penalty
statute requires a finding of one or more enumerated special circumstances for death eligibility.
Contrary to the teachings of Furman, however, we found that several of California’s special
circumstances apply disparately based on the race or ethnicity of the defendant. In so doing, the
statute appears to codify rather than ameliorate the harmful racial stereotypes that are endemic
to our criminal justice system. The instantiation of racial and ethnic stereotypes into death
eligibility raises the specter of discriminatory application of California’s statute, with implications
for constitutional regulation of capital punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the possible racial and ethnic implications of
California’s expansive death penalty statute in light of the Eighth
Amendment’s requirement that each state statute narrow the subclass of
offenders on whom a death sentence may be imposed. The narrowing
requirement derives from the holding in Furman v. Georgia1 over forty-five
years ago, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that existing death penalty
statutes violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments.2 Citing statistics demonstrating arbitrary and
capricious application of capital punishment, a majority of the Justices
concluded that a death sentencing scheme is unconstitutional if it provides
“no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”3
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia4 and its companion cases,5 the
Supreme Court reviewed the subsequently enacted statutes. In upholding some
of the statutes, the Court in a plurality opinion explained, “Furman mandates that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”6 Thus, “[t]o pass constitutional
muster, a capital sentencing scheme must ‘genuinely narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others
found guilty of murder.’”7 Importantly, the Court stated that the direction
and limitation must be provided by statute so that the selection of persons
eligible for a death sentence is “circumscribed by . . . legislative guidelines.”8 This
constitutional guidance was designed to limit the discretion of individual

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 239–40 (per curiam).
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362
(1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427–28 (1980) (plurality opinion).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874
(1983) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S at 189 (plurality opinion)).
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 877).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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prosecutors to charge capital defendants and of judges and juries to impose death
sentences.9
In previous research using the same data, we presented empirical
findings regarding California’s death penalty scheme.10 Under California’s
death penalty statute, a defendant convicted of first-degree murder is eligible for a
death sentence if the jury also finds the existence of one or more enumerated
special circumstances. We found that the scope of death eligibility under
California law following Furman was quite expansive: 95 percent of firstdegree murder convictions qualify for a death sentence under the California
statute in effect in 2008.11 We also found that only a fraction of those eligible
for a death sentence were actually sentenced to death: Only 4.3 percent of
defendants who committed a factually eligible capital murder were
sentenced to death,12 a rate that is far lower than the 15–20 percent rate that
the Furman Court viewed as evidence of arbitrariness.13
This Article builds on that foundation and shows that, contrary to the
teachings of Furman, six of California’s special circumstances apply
unevenly based on the defendant’s race or ethnicity. In so doing, the statute

9.
10.

11.

12.
13.

See, e.g., Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244 (“The use of ‘aggravating circumstances’ is not an
end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and
thereby channeling the jury’s discretion.”).
David Baldus, George Woodworth, Catherine Grosso, Michael Laurence, Jeffrey Fagan,
& Richard Newell, Furman at 45: Constitutional Challenges from California’s Failure to
(Again) Narrow Death Eligibility, 16 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 693 (2019). These findings were
previously submitted on behalf of two California death row inmates who challenged the
constitutionality of their death sentences in part on the grounds that California’s statute
fails to satisfy the narrowing requirements of Furman. The inmates, Jerry Frye and
Troy Ashmus, are challenging their convictions and death sentences in federal habeas
corpus proceedings. Frye v. Warden, No. 2:99-cv-0628, 2015 WL 300755 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 22, 2015); Ashmus v. Davis, No. 93-cv-0594, 2017 WL 2876842 (N.D. Cal. July 6,
2017).
We also analyzed the cases to determine whether the crimes could have been charged as
capital crimes but resulted in noncapital convictions. Of the factually first-degree
murder cases, 86 percent are death eligible. Among defendants convicted of seconddegree murder or voluntary manslaughter, the death-eligibility rate is 60 percent.
Baldus et al., supra note 10.
Baldus et al., supra note 10, at fig.2 & tbl.6.
The evidence before the Court in Furman was that “15% to 20% of those convicted of
murder are sentenced to death in States where it is authorized.” Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 386–87 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 435–36 n.19 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (citing Hugo A. Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907–1960, 19
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1964) (“[B]etween 1916 and 1955, 157 out of 652 persons charged
with murder received the death sentence in New Jersey—about 20%; between 1956 and
1960, 13 out of 61 received the death sentence—also about 20%.”)).
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appears to codify rather than ameliorate the harmful racial stereotypes that
are endemic to our criminal justice system.14
Part I presents a closer look at Furman v. Georgia and the
jurisprudence around race and capital punishment. Part II examines
California’s capital punishment statutes with special attention to the state’s
response to the Eighth Amendment narrowing requirements. Part III turns
to the academic literature studying Furman’s mandates before reviewing, in
brief, ways in which race and ethnicity have been central to the
administration of capital punishment in the United States. Part IV explains
the details of our empirical study, including coding decisions and challenges.
Part V presents our findings, demonstrating that six of California’s special
circumstances apply disparately based on race and ethnicity. Finally, the
conclusion discusses the importance of these findings in light of Furman’s
goals and requirements.

I.

FURMAN, RACE, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

In Furman v. Georgia,15 the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the
application of capital punishment and held that all then-current death
penalty statutes violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’
proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment.16 Several justices
concurring in the judgment concluded that statutes allowing infrequent and
seemingly random imposition of the death penalty on only a small
percentage of death-eligible criminal defendants violated the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments because they permitted the death
penalty “to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”17
Furman and its progeny made clear that the Eighth Amendment
demands that each legislature set forth standards and criteria to regulate its
state capital sentencing system to avoid an unconstitutional pattern of
arbitrary and capricious sentences.18 At a minimum, to “avoid [the]
constitutional flaw,” state death penalty statutes, by rational and objective
criteria, “must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

See generally April D. Fernandes & Robert D. Crutchfield, Race, Crime, and Criminal
Justice: Fifty Years Since The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 17 CRIM. & PUB.
POL’Y 397 (2018); THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA
(Samuel Walker, Cassia Spohn & Miriam DeLone eds., 2012).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 239 (per curiam).
Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”19
Of concern to several justices in the Furman majority were suggestions
that death sentences were impermissibly influenced by race. Justice Douglas
cited racial disparities as a basis for striking down the statutes.20 Justice
Stewart similarly concluded that “if any basis can be discerned for the
selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally
impermissible basis of race.”21 Justice Marshall noted that racial disparities
were still prevalent at the time of Furman, but acknowledged the insufficient
record before the Court to conclude that there was evidence of
discrimination. The same was true in Maxwell v. Bishop in which the
justices rejected a constitutional challenge to capital punishment statutes
and prevented any conclusive holding that racial bias infected all death
sentences imposed on nonwhite defendants.22
Four years after Furman, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed state death
penalty statutes enacted in the years after Furman that attempted to cure
previous constitutional deficiencies.23 In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court recognized the relevant statistics relied upon in Furman24 and
reiterated the constitutional rule that legislatures must distinguish “the few

19.
20.

21.
22.

23.
24.

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (stating the mandate
of Furman).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas cited a host of
statistical analyses finding that race had a significant role in the imposition of death
sentences. See, e.g., id. at 249–50 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting the 1967
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, which
found that “[t]he death sentence is disproportionately imposed and carried out on the
poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups.”); id. at 250 n.15 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Hugo Bedau’s conclusion that “[a]lthough there may be a host of
factors other than race involved in this frequency distribution, something more than
chance has operated over the years to produce this racial difference”); id. (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (citing Marvin Wolfgang and his colleagues’ findings that racial bias
affected the sentencing and execution of defendants in 439 death cases from 1914–
1958).
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
408 U.S. at 449–50 (Marshall, J., concurring) (referring to Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d
138, 147 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (“We therefore reject the
statistical argument in its attempted application to Maxwell’s case. Whatever value that
argument may have as an instrument of social concern, whatever suspicion it may
arouse with respect to southern interracial rape trials as a group over a long period of
time, and whatever it may disclose with respect to other localities, we feel that the
statistical argument does nothing to destroy the integrity of Maxwell’s trial.”)).
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 n.26 (plurality opinion).
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cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not.”25 The Court in Gregg upheld the revised Georgia statute, finding
that it adequately “narrow[ed] the class of murderers subject to capital
punishment by specifying 10 statutory aggravating circumstances,” which
channeled the jury’s discretion and protected against “a jury wantonly and
freakishly impos[ing] the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the
legislative guidelines.”26
In his concurrence in Gregg, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, explained the rationale for the statutory
narrowing requirement:
As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be
imposed become more narrowly defined and are limited to those
which are particularly serious or for which the death penalty is
peculiarly appropriate . . . it becomes reasonable to expect that
juries—even given discretion not to impose the death penalty—
will impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases
so defined. If they do, it can no longer be said that the penalty is
being imposed wantonly and freakishly or so infrequently that it loses
its usefulness as a sentencing device.27

Thus, the Supreme Court relies on the Eighth Amendment’s narrowing
principle to assure that the selection of defendants actually sentenced to
death is regulated by legislatively prescribed criteria of sufficient certainty to
guard against arbitrariness and caprice.28
In 1987, in McCleskey v. Kemp,29 the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the
application of the Georgia death penalty statute in light of statistical
evidence that Georgia death sentences were impermissibly influenced by
racial considerations. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Furman that the
Eighth Amendment is violated where “the death penalty [is] so irrationally

25.
26.

27.

28.
29.

Id. at 188 (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)).
Id. at 196–97, 207 (plurality opinion). In contrast, the Court invalidated statutes that
required the mandatory imposition of a death sentence precisely because they do not
permit individualized sentencing decisions. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
304 (1976).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222 (White, J., concurring); cf. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878
(“Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circumstances play a
constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they
circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.”).
See Chelsea Creo Sharon, The “Most Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing Requirement
and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 247 (2011).
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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imposed that any particular death sentence could be presumed excessive
[and] . . . there was no basis for determining in any particular case whether
the penalty was proportionate to the crime . . . .”30 Similarly, a “capital
punishment system [that] operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner”
violates the U.S. Constitution.31
The Court began its Eighth Amendment analysis of McCleskey’s
statistical evidence by reviewing the procedural safeguards adopted by the
Georgia legislature to avoid such unconstitutional application.32 The Court
found that these features, including provisions in the statute that “narrow[]
the class of murders subject to the death penalty,” alleviated the concerns
articulated in Furman.33 As a result of these protections, the Court “lawfully
may presume that McCleskey’s death sentence was not ‘wantonly and
freakishly’ imposed, and thus that the sentence is not disproportionate
within any recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment.”34 Applying
this presumption, the Court declined to accept statistical evidence proffered
by McCleskey as a “constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of racial
prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions.”35 In the more than
thirty years since the McCleskey ruling, the Court has rarely visited the

30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.

Id. at 301.
Id. at 306.
The statistical analysis, conducted by David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George
Woodworth, examined over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the
1970s. Id. at 286. The Court summarized the findings as follows:
Baldus subjected his data to an extensive analysis, taking account of 230
variables that could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds.
One of his models concludes that, even after taking account of 39
nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white
victims . . . [faced] 4.3 times [the odds of] . . . receiv[ing] a death sentence
as defendants charged with killing blacks. According to this model, black
defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other
defendants. Thus, the Baldus study indicates that black defendants, such
as McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of
receiving the death penalty.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 308 (citations omitted).
Id. at 309. The Court also held that the statistical evidence did not establish an equal
protection violation. Id. at 298. Noting its finding in Gregg v. Georgia that the Georgia
capital sentencing scheme could be fair and neutral, the Court concluded that there was
no evidence that the Georgia legislature enacted the death penalty statute for a racially
discriminatory purpose. Id.
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question of racial bias in death sentencing other than in narrow holdings to
correct case-specific, egregious expressions of racial animus at trial.36

II.

CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE TO THE COURT’S
EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROSCRIPTIONS

California, like several other states,37 addresses the narrowing
requirement by broadly defining capital offenses and then requiring the trier
of fact to find at least one statutory aggravating factor that makes the
defendant’s crime subject to a death sentence.38 The California death
penalty statute defines death eligibility as the commission of a first-degree
murder with the presence of one or more enumerated special
circumstances.39 California defines first-degree murder as all murder that is
perpetrated by means of:

36.

37.
38.

39.



A destructive device,



Any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing,

See, e.g., Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776–77 (2017) (finding defense counsel rendered
deficient and prejudicial representation by introducing expert testimony that Mr. Buck,
the defendant, was statistically more likely to act violently in the future because he was
Black).
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2019); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-30 (2019).
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2 (West 2019) (requiring a finding of the
presence of an enumerated “special circumstance” before a defendant is subject to a
capital sentence). Although California uses the term special circumstances to define
death eligibility, other states use the terms aggravating factors or aggravating
circumstances for statutory provisions that define death eligibility. As the California
Supreme Court held in People v. Bacigalupo, 826 P.2d 808 (Cal. 1993), under the
California death penalty law, “the section 190.2 ‘special circumstances’ perform the
same constitutionally required ‘narrowing’ function as the ‘aggravating circumstances’
or ‘aggravating factors’ that some of the other states use in their capital sentencing
statutes.” Id. at 468; see also id. at 477 (emphasizing that the section 190.3 aggravating
factors used in the selection phase of the California death penalty scheme “do not
perform a ‘narrowing’ function”); People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 537 (Cal. 1992)
(rejecting that under Furman and Maynard, the aggravating factors in section 190.3
must limit “open-ended discretion” in the selection phase of the California death
penalty scheme because it is instead the special circumstances in section 190.2 that
function “to channel jury discretion by narrowing the class of defendants who are
eligible for the death penalty”); People v. Cornwell, 117 P.3d 622, 657 (Cal. 2005) (“The
state death penalty scheme meets Eighth Amendment requirements through its listing
of special circumstances; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in
section 190.3 do not and need not perform a narrowing function.”).
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2 (West 2019).
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Committed in the perpetration of arson, rape, carjacking,
robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking,
torture, sodomy, or one of several sex crimes, or



Discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally
at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to
inflict death.40
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The development and application of special circumstances unfolded in
several discrete stages to create unprecedented levels of death eligibility.41 In
1977, the California legislature enacted a relatively narrow statute that
enumerated several murders as capital crimes.42 A year later, the Briggs
Initiative43 significantly expanded the scope of California’s special
circumstances.44 Its drafters intended for California’s death penalty to apply
to “all homicides committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an
accomplice in, the commission of, the attempted commission of, or the
immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit serious felonies,
as well as all willful and intentional homicides,” including all first-degree
murders.45 Donald Heller, the attorney assigned to draft the initiative,
complied with Senator John Briggs’s instruction to be “as broad and
inclusive as possible” and did not apply the narrowing requirement

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.
45.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2019). One of the most interesting features of the
California statute, which is part of its breadth, is its treatment of premeditation: “To
prove that the killing was ‘deliberate and premeditated,’ it is not be necessary to prove
the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his or her act.”
Id. at § 189(d).
After Furman, the California legislature enacted a death penalty statute in 1973 that
mandated imposition of the death penalty for individuals found guilty of first-degree
murder when one of ten special circumstances were present. 1973 Cal. Stat. 1297, §§ 1–
5. In 1976, the California Supreme Court invalidated the mandatory statute pursuant
to the decision in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Rockwell v.
Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101 (Cal. 1976).
Initiative and Measure Proposition 7, Nov. 7, 1978 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2 (West 2019)); see also Historical Note in CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2019).
The 1977 statute contained several felony-murder special circumstances but limited
those circumstances to cases in which the murder was “willful, deliberate, and
premeditated.” People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 606 (Cal. 1979).
See, e.g., Gerald F. Uelmen, California Death Penalty Laws and the California Supreme
Court: A Ten Year Perspective, SANTA CLARA L. DIGITAL COMMONS, Apr. 22, 1986, at 2,
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.co
m/&httpsredir=1&article=1800&context=facpubs [https://perma.cc/8PDT-4DQL].
See, e.g., id. at 32–33.
Declaration of Donald H. Heller, at 1–2, submitted as Exhibit 183 in Ashmus v. Wong,
No. 3:93-CV-00594-TEH (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1993) (statement of drafter of Briggs
Initiative); see also W.E. Barnes, Sen. Briggs: ‘Your Life is in Danger’, S.F. EXAMINER &
CHRON., April 2, 1978, at A10.
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recognized in Furman.46 Accordingly, the Briggs Initiative’s sponsors
promised California voters in campaign and ballot materials that the statute
would expand the applicability of the death penalty to “every murderer.”47
The Briggs Initiative “sought to achieve this result” in two ways: first,
by “more than doubl[ing] the number of special circumstances” delineated
in the prior law; and second, by “substantially broaden[ing] the definitions”
of the prior law’s special circumstances.48 This first stage of expanding death
eligibility following the approval of the Briggs’ Initiative lasted about six years.
In 1983, the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Carlos v. Superior
Court49 created an interim stage that lasted nearly four years and temporarily
narrowed the application of capital punishment. The court held that the
felony-murder special circumstances required the state to prove that a
defendant possessed the intent to kill during the commission of the felony.50
The Carlos ruling, however, applies only to murders committed between
December 12, 1983, the date on which Carlos was decided, and October 13,
1987, the date on which it was overruled by People v. Anderson.51
The current stage is the post-Carlos period. Both before and after
Carlos, the panoply of special circumstances expanded over the course of
three decades,52 eventually reaching the current thirty-two special
circumstances.53

46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Declaration of Donald H. Heller, supra note 45, at 1–2.
Declaration of Gerald F. Uelmen, at 7, submitted as Exhibit 33 in Ashmus v. Wong, No.
3:93-cv-00594-TEH (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1993).
Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for
Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1311–13 (1997); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2
(West 1988). The 1978 expansion of capital punishment’s applicability in California
evoked widespread concern about the constitutionality of the Briggs Initiative, even
among those involved in its enforcement. “Members of the law enforcement
community and those charged with prosecuting offenders of the laws of California
expressed constitutional concerns about the breath of the proposed initiative, with its
expansive list of death-eligible crimes.” Declaration of Gerald F. Uelmen, supra note
47, at 7–8.
672 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1983).
Id.
742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987) (holding that intent to kill is not a requirement to find a
felony-murder special circumstance for a defendant who is the actual killer).
See generally Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem:
Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 81 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2019). The special circumstances are enumerated in
twenty-two paragraphs, one of which, paragraph 17, contains twelve subparagraphs
each defining an independent basis for death eligibility. Id. Although Penal Code
section 190.2 contains thirty-three special circumstances, the California Supreme Court
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The addition of several special circumstances in the mid-1990s and
2000 are of particular concern in this study. In 1995, the California
legislature added special circumstances to Penal Code section 190.2,
including murders occurring during the commission of carjackings54 and
drive-by shootings.55 The author of Senate Bill 9 justified the expansion of
the death penalty as necessary to combat gang violence, arguing that “[i]n
today’s society, gang-related shootings have become commonplace.
Frequently, the victim is an unintended target, such as a child, a productive
high school student with no gang affiliation, or a young mother who happens to
live in the neighborhood targeted by drive-by shooters.”56
Opponents to these provisions warned the California legislature that
“the broader the cases that are eligible for the death [penalty] as a
punishment, the greater the risk that the death penalty will be applied in an
arbitrary and unconstitutional manner.”57
The California Attorney
General’s Office expressed concern that the cumulative expansions of
eligibility for the death penalty resulted in few crimes not being covered by
the California scheme.58

54.

55.
56.

57.

58.

invalidated section 190.2(a)(14) as unconstitutional. People v. Superior Court (In re
Engert), 647 P.2d 76 (Cal. 1982).
1995 Cal. Stat. 3554 § 1(a)(17)(L) (S.B. 32). California voters approved Senate Bill 32
with the passage of Proposition 195, effective March 27, 1995. As a result, the felonymurder carjacking special circumstance and the juror killing special circumstance were
added to the Penal Code as sections 190.2(a)(17)(L) and 190.2(a)(20), and the felonymurder kidnapping special circumstance was expanded to include murders resulting
from kidnapping in Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17)(B).
1995 Cal. Stat. 3561 (a)(20) (S.B. 9).
ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 9, 1995–1996 LEG., REG. SESS., at 3
(Cal.
June
27,
1995),
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/sen/sb_00010050/sb_9_cfa_950626_093857_asm_comm.html [https://perma.cc/U8GB-QNUH].
Senate Bill 9 was approved by voters with the passage of Proposition 196, effective
March 27, 1995. The drive-by murder special circumstance was added as Penal Code
section 190.2(21). Id.
S. COMM. ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 32, 1995–1996 LEG., REG.
SESS., at 7(b) (Mar. 7, 1995) (citing opposition submitted by the American Civil
Liberties
Union),
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/
sb_32_cfa_950221_155939_sen_comm.html [https://perma.cc/8W5C-QFLP].
Mike Lewis, Death Penalty Quietly Moves Into Broader Territory, S.F. DAILY J., Mar. 20,
1996, at 1, 1, 7 (quoting Attorney General’s Death Penalty Coordinator as “it is
conceivable, although unlikely, that those who seek to further modify the law eventually
could run out of legal territory to carve out.”); Mike Lewis, Expansion of Capital Crimes
Nears Passage, HERALD RECORDER, Sept. 19, 1995, at 1, 15 (“‘In the abstract, you could
toss a bunch more crap in there, but you have to know your constitutional limits,’ said
George Williamson, chief of the criminal division in the attorney general’ office. ‘You
have to be very careful.’”).
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Opponents of these measures were concerned about the potential for
racial disparities in the operation of California’s capital punishment
statute.59 To avoid these unconstitutional results, the American Civil
Liberties Union urged the California legislature to amend both statutes to
prohibit the execution of a death sentence that was the product of racial
discrimination.60
Although the legislature rejected the proffered
amendments, the author of Senate Bill 32 committed to examining whether
provisions should be enacted to “avoid unequal enforcement of the death
penalty.”61
Despite these concerns, five years later, voters expanded the statute
again by approving Proposition 21, which, inter alia, added the gang-related
murder special circumstance.62 A ballot pamphlet argument urging its
passage stated, “Proposition 21 ends the ‘slap on the wrist’ of current law by
imposing real consequences for GANG MEMBERS, RAPISTS AND
MURDERERS who cannot be reached through prevention or education.”63
In effect, the statute delegated discretion for death penalty eligibility to the
police definitions of gang-related crime and rosters of persons thought to be
gang members.64 In response to the expansions of Penal Code section 190.2,

59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Opposition to Senate Bill 9, at 1 (June 14,
1995) (citing Justice Blackmun’s observation that “the death penalty remains fraught
with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice and mistake.”); American Civil Liberties
Union Opposition to Senate Bill 32 (Mar. 1, 1995) (same); Friends Committee on
Legislation Opposition to Senate Bill 9 (Feb. 2, 1995) (citing Justice Blackman’s belief
that the death penalty “permits the issue of race to determine who lives and who dies”);
Friends Committee on Legislation Opposition to Senate Bill 32 (June 14, 1995) (same).
See, e.g., ACLU, Proposed Amendments to Senate Bill 32 (Mar. 6, 1995).
SENATE BILL 32 ANALYSIS WORKSHEET at 4 (undated).
Historical Note in CAL. PENAL Code § 190.2(a)(22) (West 2019). This was approved by
voters on March 7, 2000. 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 21 (West).
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2000, PRIMARY 48 (2000),
https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2187&context=ca_ballot_
props [https://perma.cc/FFR5-GBZV].
See, e.g., Anita Chabria, A Routine Police Stop Landed him on California’s Gang
Database. Is It Racial Profiling?, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-gang-database-calgang-criminal-justice-reform20190509-story.html [https://perma.cc/GWL3-YVDJ] (showing that the CalGang database is
“filled with errors and lack[s] accountability” and therefore may be “a vehicle for racial
profiling”); ELAINE M. HOWLE, THE CALGANG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM:
REPORT 2015–130 12, 66 (2016), https://auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2015-130.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QV2U-7SCB] (showing that the racial composition of CalGang
database is racially disparate from state population); see also Alice Speri, New York
Gang Database Expanded by 70 Percent Under Mayor Bill De Blasio, THE INTERCEPT (June
11, 2018, 7:49 AM), https://interc.pt/2y2fIVB [https://perma.cc/S68M-R4R2] (discussing the
expansion of New York’s Gang Database); People v. Cramer, No. H034348, 2016 WL
7494889 (Cal. App. 2016 Dec. 30, 2016) (reversing a conviction for drug sales because
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preeminent California legal scholar Gerald Uelmen testified that California
death penalty law “imposes no meaningful limitations on the broad
discretion of prosecutors and juries to seek and impose the death penalty for
first degree murders in California.”65 He observed, “[t]here is nothing
‘special’ about the special circumstances in California’s death penalty law; they
have been deliberately designed to encompass nearly all first degree murders.”66
Defendants facing the death penalty have regularly challenged the
constitutionality of California’s death penalty law throughout its evolution.67
The California Supreme Court has consistently held that the statute satisfies
the constitutionally required narrowing function by the use of the special
circumstances set forth in Penal Code section 190.2(a).68

III.

OVERBREADTH, RACE, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

This Part provides a brief context in the relevant literature for the
findings presented below.69 We first review the literature on measuring the
success of capital punishment statutes in fulfilling the narrowing mandate
arising from Furman. We then turn to the history of race and capital
punishment in the United States and discuss some of the many ways in which
racial bias is manifested in the administration of capital punishment.

65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

of the trial court’s admission of unduly prejudicial gang evidence proffered by police
officers based on gang roster data).
Declaration of Gerald F. Uelmen, supra note 47, at 27.
Id.
As of March 8, 2019, Westlaw reports almost 2,000 opinions relating to CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2 have been published by the California Supreme Court alone and more
than 800 cases have been brought in federal courts.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2019); see also, e.g., People v. Bacigalupo, 826 P.2d 808
(Cal. 1993); People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 430–31 (Cal. 1992) (rejecting the
application of the requirement of Furman and Maynard that the section 190.3
aggravating factors in the selection phase of the California death penalty scheme must
limit “open-ended discretion” because they do not perform a narrowing function;
rather, under California’s death penalty statute, special circumstances in section 190.2
function “to channel jury discretion by narrowing the class of defendants who are
eligible for the death penalty”); People v. Cornwell, 117 P.3d 622, 657 (Cal. 2005) (“The
state death penalty scheme meets Eighth Amendment requirements through its listing
of special circumstances; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in
section 190.3 do not and need not perform a narrowing function.”).
See infra Part V.
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Furman’s Failure: Overbreadth in Capital Murder Charging

Furman, Gregg, and subsequent cases should have produced, across the
states authorizing capital punishment, a narrow set of cases that clearly
identifies crimes that are readily distinguished from ordinary murders. The
evidence to date, however, suggests that the narrowing requirement has not
been satisfied.70 Relatively few studies estimate the rate of death eligibility
using case law research because of the vast scope of such an undertaking.
The studies that have been conducted, however, raise serious questions
about the ability of the post-Furman statutory schemes to narrow
meaningfully the class of cases identified as death eligible.71 A second set of
studies provides an estimate of death sentencing among death-eligible
homicides, again suggesting that the substantial narrowing requirements of
Furman and Gregg have not been applied successfully.72
70.
71.

72.

See Baldus et al., supra note 10 (showing high rates of death-eligibility in recent
narrowing studies).
See, e.g., Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 48, at 1328–29, 1332 (finding that 86.5 percent of
first-degree murder cases in California were death eligible under the statute, and that
9.6 percent of those cases resulted in a death sentence); DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE
WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 268 n.31 (1990) (finding that 86 percent of murder
cases in Georgia in the first five years of the post-Furman regime (1988–1992) were
death eligible); Justin Marceau & Wanda Fogila, Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many
Are Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1107 (2012) (finding that
Colorado’s capital sentencing system defined 90 percent of factually or actually firstdegree murder cases as death eligible); Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Sarah
Bacon & Andrew Ditchfield, Justice by Geography and Race: The Administrative of the
Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978–1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. ON RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, &
CLASS 1, 18–19, 52, fig.1 (2004) (finding that approximately 21 percent of first- and
second-degree murder cases between August 1978 and September 1999 were death
eligible (1,311 of approximately 6,000)); David C. Baldus, George Woodworth,
Catherine M. Grosso & Aaron M. Christ, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska
Experience (1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 541 & n.181 (2002) (finding that 25
percent of homicides (175/689) were death eligible under the Nebraska death
sentencing system between 1973 and 1999). But see George Brauchler & Rich Orman,
Lies, Damn Lies, and Anti-Death Penalty Research, 93 DENV. L. REV. 635, 637 (2016)
(presenting the article as “in part, a rebuttal to” Marceau and Kamin).
See, e.g., Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso, George Woodworth & Abijah Taylor,
Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and Sentencing in North Carolina,
1990–2009, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1997, 2024 tbl.2 (2016) (estimating that death-eligible
murder cases in North Carolina during the 1990–2009 study period resulted in a death
sentence in an estimated 6 percent of the cases); John J. Donohue III, An Empirical
Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful
Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 641
(2014) (reporting that the Connecticut capital sentencing scheme between 1973 and
2007 starts from the universe of death-eligible homicides and estimates that 5.8 percent
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Most importantly for this Article, our previous findings report that
California’s death penalty statute fails to comply with the Eighth
Amendment’s narrowing requirement. First, we found that the deatheligibility rate among California homicide cases was the highest in the
nation during the study period. We found that 95 percent of all first-degree
murder convictions and 43 percent of all second-degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter convictions were death eligible under the California
statute in effect in 2008. Second, we documented that a death sentence is
imposed in only a small fraction of the death-eligible cases. As a result, the
California death-sentencing rate of 4.3 percent of all death-eligible cases is
among the lowest in the nation and over two-thirds lower than the deathsentencing rate in pre-Furman Georgia.73
Although a number of studies of charging and sentencing outcomes
have identified racial disparities arising from post-Furman capital
punishment schemes, we are not aware of any previous study that has closely
examined racial disparities in the application of individual factors in a state
death-eligibility statute. We address this question by analyzing the
application of specific statutory special circumstances in California’s death
penalty statute. The extent to which this promiscuously broad statute
creates room for arbitrary and capricious charging decisions—which
themselves are racially biased—is the focus of our study.
B.

Race and Capital Punishment

As a starting point, it is useful to review the death penalty’s long
association with racism in the United States. This history informs both our
analysis of the statutes and the implications of our findings. As noted above,
opponents to the expansion of the California death penalty statute expressly

73.

of death-eligible homicides resulted in a death sentence (12/205)); Katherine Beckett &
Heather Evans, Race, Death, and Justice: Capital Sentencing in Washington State, 1981–
2014, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 77, 90 (2016) (estimating a death-sentencing rate among
death-eligible homicides of 11.7 percent (35/298)); David C. Baldus, Catherine M.
Grosso, George Woodworth & Richard Newell, Racial Discrimination in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United States Armed Forces
(1984–2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1229 (2011) (reporting an
approximately 15 percent death-sentencing rate for cases between July 16, 1984, and
October 13, 2005); Scott Phillips, Continued Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital
Punishment: The Rosenthal Era, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 131, 144 (2012) (estimating a 3–5
percent death sentencing rate based on carefully curated Supplemental Homicide
Reports on Texas homicides as estimates).
See generally Baldus et al., supra note 10.
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invoked this history in their interventions. Racial disparities have been
endemic to the administration of capital punishment since the nation’s
founding.74 Although much of the literature focuses on discrimination
against black defendants and victims, a growing body of literature has begun
to document and analyze the deep and pervasive history of discrimination
against Latinx defendants and victims.75
The disparities can be traced in part to overtly racist criminal laws from
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Before the Civil War, many
Southern states explicitly legislated that slaves—and sometimes free blacks—
could be sentenced to death for crimes punishable by lesser penalties when
committed by whites.76 Although the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of differential penalties by race for the same crime—and
explicitly prohibits “the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the
white man is not to be hanged”77—the death penalty has continued to be

74.

75.

76.
77.

See CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 78 (2016); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 89–118 (2003); Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race
and the Death Penalty in Historical Perspective, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING
STATE 96 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006); JAMES W. MARQUART,
SHELDEN ECKLAND-OLSON & JONATHAN SORENSEN, THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE
NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923–1990 (1994); Stephen B. Bright,
Discrimination, Death, and Denial: Race and the Death Penalty, in THE MACHINERY OF
DEATH: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY REGIME 45 (David R. Dow & Mark
Dow eds., 2002).
See Richard Delgado, The Law of the Noose: A History of Latino Lynching, 44 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 304–07 (2009) (exploring why the history of Latinx lynching is
not better known); Martin G. Urbina, A Qualitative Analysis of Latinos Executed in the
United States Between 1975 and 1995: Who Were They?, 31 SOC. JUST. 242, 242 (2004)
(noting that prior research has followed a black/white dichotomous approach); see
generally JOHN MACK FARAGHER, ETERNITY STREET: VIOLENCE AND JUSTICE IN FRONTIER
LOS ANGELES 263–280 (2016) (documenting the use of lynching to punish and terrorize
Latinx people in Los Angeles and Northern California); Camilo M. Ortiz, Latinos
Nowhere in Sight: Erased by Racism, Nativism, the Black-White Binary, and
Authoritarianism, 132 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 29 (2012) (collecting evidence of
discrimination against Latinxs).
See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 140–42 (2002);
WILLIAM BOWERS ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864–
1982 139–40 (1984); DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION 172 (2010).
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877
244–47, 256–59 (1988) (observing that Civil Rights Act supporters in the 39th U.S.
Congress “rejected the entire idea of laws differentiating between Black and white in
access to the courts and penalties for crimes. The shadow of the Black Codes hung over
these debates, and [Congressman Lyman] Trumbull began his discussion of the Civil
Rights Bill with a reference to recent laws of Mississippi and South Carolina, declaring
his intention ‘to destroy all these discriminations.’”).
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applied predominantly to black defendants as well as those convicted of
crimes against white victims throughout the country’s history.78
A robust literature confirms that racial disparities have infected capital
punishment in the modern era.79 Between 1930, when official statistics on
capital punishment were first issued, and the moratorium in executions in
1972 following Furman v. Georgia, almost half the persons executed for
murder and 90 percent of those executed for rape were African American,
despite their much lower share of the defendant population for each of those
crimes and their share of the U.S. population.80 Those same racial disparities
in capital punishment animated the majority concurrences of three of the
justices in Furman.
Race as a contested jurisprudential factor in death sentencing and
execution reached a watershed in McCleskey v. Kemp.81 Although the Court
concluded that the proof of arbitrariness arising from race in death
sentences was inadequate to prove a constitutional violation, forty years of
continued study since then have demonstrated that the system is indeed
arbitrary. Despite the strong evidence of interracial and intraracial
sentencing disparities,82 evidence that the Court did not contest, the
McCleskey majority required a showing of discriminatory purpose to satisfy
the evidentiary demands of a discrimination claim.83

78.

79.

80.
81.
82.
83.

See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING
STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 211, 212 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. &
Austin Sarat eds., 2006).
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Capital Punishment, in BEYOND REPAIR?: AMERICA’S
DEATH PENALTY 121 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003); see generally Symposium, Race to
Execution, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1401 (2004); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death
and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995); Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Paul Kaplan & Jaime
Longazel, Racist Localisms and the Enduring Cultural Life of America’s Death Penalty:
Lessons from Maricopa County, Arizona, 66 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 63 (2015); O’Brien et al.,
supra note 72; Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial
Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (1994).
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and
After McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 35–37 (2007) (“A cardinal feature of
the death penalty in the United States has always been its racially biased use.”).
481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987).
See generally Baldus et al., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 71
(presenting the studies underlying McCleskey’s claim, in full).
481 U.S. at 292. In a conversation with John Jeffries, Justice Powell’s biographer,
shortly after he left the Court, Justice Powell expressed his regrets at having written the
majority opinion in McCleskey. Justice Powell said that given a second chance, he
would now join the four dissenters in that case and reverse the majority of death
sentences in the United States. Justice Powell went further, asserting that “capital
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Both before and after the McCleskey decision, research on racial disparities in
capital punishment focused on charging decisions by prosecutors and sentencing
decisions by judges and juries, finding robust and consistent evidence of disparate
racial treatment of black or Latinx defendants or victims.84 Studies with varying
levels of detail and methodological sophistication have been conducted in
numerous states.85 Although not universal, the overwhelming majority of these

84.

85.

punishment should be abolished.” John C. Jeffries Jr., A Change of Mind that Came Too Late,
N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/23/opinion/a-change-of-mindthat-came-too-late.html [https://perma.cc/426T-RNN2].
See Catherine M. Grosso et al., Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty, in
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 525, 540 (James R. Acker, Robert M.
Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed. 2014) (reviewing the literature).
In alphabetical order by state: PEG BORTNER & ANDY HALL, CTR. FOR URBAN INQUIRY,
COLL. OF PUB. PROGRAMS AT ARIZ. STATE UNIV., ARIZONA FIRST-DEGREE MURDER CASES
SUMMARY OF 1995–1999 INDICTMENTS: DATA SET II, RESEARCH REPORT TO ARIZONA
CAPITAL CASE COMMISSION (2002); Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of
Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 33
(1991); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate
Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1 (2005); Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with
Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
1227 (2012) (California); Scott Anderson, As Flies to Wanton Boys: Death-Eligible
Defendants in Georgia and Colorado, 40 TRIAL TALK 9–16 (1991); Stephanie Hindson et
al., Race, Gender, Region and Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980–1999, 77 U. COLO. L.
REV. 549 (2006); Meg Beardsley et al., Disquieting Discretion: Race, Geography & the
Colorado Death Penalty in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, 92 DENV. U. L.
REV. 431 (2015) (Colorado); Donohue III, supra note 72 (Connecticut); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans & Martin T. Wells, The
Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1925 (2012); BALDUS ET
AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 71 (Georgia); Sherod Thaxton,
Disentangling Disparity: Exploring Racially Disparate Effect and Treatment in Capital
Charging, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 95 (2018) (Georgia); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet,
Race, Region and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988–1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39 (2002);
Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder
Trials: 1976–1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 17 (1995); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L.
Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish, 1990–2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647
(2011) (Louisiana); Raymond Paternoster & Robert Brame, Reassessing Race Disparities
in Maryland Capital Cases, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 971 (2008); Katherine Barnes et al., Place
Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in Death-Eligible
Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (2009) (Missouri); Michael Lenza et al., The Prevailing
Injustices in the Application of the Missouri Death Penalty (1978–1996), 32 SOC. JUST.
151 (2005); Baldus et al. Arbitrariness and Discrimination, supra note 71, at 486
(Nebraska); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992); Leigh Bienen et al., The
Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion,
41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27 (1988); DAVID S. BAIME, REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT:
SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT 2000–2001 TERM (JUNE 1, 2001) (New
Jersey); O’Brien et al., supra note 72 (North Carolina); David C. Baldus, George
Woodworth, David Zuckerman & Neil Alan Weiner, Racial Discrimination and the
Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent
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studies indicate that a defendant’s likelihood of receiving the death penalty is
enhanced if the victim is white as opposed to black, Latinx, or another race.86
Subsequent charging and sentencing studies find lower odds but consistent
and statistically significant disparities.87
For example, a recent study of capital charging and sentencing
decisions in North Carolina between 1990 and 2009 was modeled on the
Baldus study of Georgia.88 The primary model analyzing death sentencing
among all death-eligible cases showed that—even after controlling for
multiple measures of culpability—defendants in cases with at least one white
victim faced odds of receiving a death sentence that were 2.17 times the odds
faced by defendants in all other cases. The evidence further suggested that
this effect arises primarily in charging decisions, when prosecutors
systematically disregard cases in which black defendants kill black victims.
The odds of a black defendant/black victim case advancing to a capital trial
were 2.6 times lower than the odds faced by all other cases. The study found
that white victim cases and black defendant/black victim cases pulled

86.

87.
88.

Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998) (Pennsylvania); Raymond
Paternoster & AnnMarie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death Penalty in South
Carolina: Experiences Over the First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. REV. 245 (1988); Michael J.
Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial
Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161 (2006); John
M. Scheb II et al., Race, Prosecutors, and Juries: The Death Penalty in Tennessee, 29
JUST. SYS. J. 338 (2008); Deon Brock et al., Arbitrariness in the Imposition of Death
Sentences in Texas: An Analysis of Four Counties by Offense Seriousness, Race of Victim,
and Race of Offender, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 43 (2000); Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Structured
Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty: The First Decade after Furman in Texas,
69 SOC. SCI. Q. 853 (1988); Phillips, supra note 72 (Texas); Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities
in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 807 (2008) (Texas); JOINT LEGISLATIVE
AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA’S
SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002).
See Catherine Lee, Hispanics and the Death Penalty: Discriminatory Charging Practices
in San Joaquin County, California, 35 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 17, 22 (2007) (reviewing the
literature and reporting that “[t]he results replicated previous findings, discovering that
defendants in White victim cases . . . faced much greater odds of being charged with a
death-eligible offense than did defendants in Black victim cases. This investigation also
permitted Hispanic/White comparisons. Defendants in White victim cases faced
greater odds of being charged with capital homicide than defendants in Hispanic victim
cases.”); Michelle A. Petrie & James E. Coverdill, Who Lives and Dies on Death Row?
Race, Ethnicity, and Post-Sentence Outcomes in Texas, 57 SOC. PROBS. 630, 630 (2010)
(reporting that “cases involving minorities—with black or Latinx offenders or victims—
have lower hazards of execution than cases in which both offenders and victims are
white”); Shatz & Dalton, supra note 85, at 1246–51 (reviewing the literature on race and
capital punishment).
See infra notes 89–93.
See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 71, at 44–46,
313–32 (presenting the charging and sentencing study).
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strongly in opposite directions. In both instances, race—a factor unrelated
to culpability and repugnant to the criminal justice system—played a
significant role.89
Recent research has documented additional ways that race infects
capital decisionmaking. For example, scholars have tied increased exposure
to capital punishment for Latinx defendants to “the pervasive,
dehumanizing political rhetoric surrounding immigration reform.” Maritza
Perez collects evidence of negative contacts between Latinos and the
criminal justice system to build her case. For example, she documents that
Latinos face “[a]pproximately 60 percent of hate crimes motivated by race or
ethnicity,” “are more likely than their white peers to be arrested,” “are more
likely than white people to be denied bail, required to pay bail, or obligated
to pay a higher bail to be released,” and “during plea bargaining, prosecutors
are more likely to offer Latinos punitive deals—which often include a
custodial sentence—compared to their white counterparts.” Jennifer
Eberhardt and colleagues used the data from the Baldus study of charging
and sentencing in Philadelphia to show that among defendants convicted of
murdering a white victim, defendants whose appearance was more
stereotypically black (e.g., darker skinned, with a broader nose and thicker
lips) were sentenced more harshly and, in particular, were more likely to be
sentenced to death than defendants with less stereotypically black features.
This finding held even after the researchers controlled for the many
nonracial factors that might account for the results.90 Analogous stereotypes
about Latinx defendants, including stereotypes about dangerousness, create
a risk of similar outcomes.91

89.
90.

91.

O’Brien et al., supra note 72, at 1998.
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 384 (2006)
(reporting results of an experiment on race using data from Baldus et al., EQUAL JUSTICE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 71).
See Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Victor Argothy, Lethal ‘Borders’: Elucidating Jurors’
Racialized Discipline to Punish in Latino Defendant Death Cases, 6 PUNISHMENT &
SOC’Y 67, 70 (2004) (“The image of Latin[x] Americans as ‘dangerous’ and ‘immoral’
goes back at least as early as Columbus’s voyage to the Greater Antilles in the late 15th
Century. Chronicling a series of observations of the New World, Columbus’s grossly
inaccurate descriptions of early indigenous peoples as ‘fierce’, ‘immoral’, and
‘cannibalistic’, served as important ‘seeds for the development of racialized
stereotypes.’”) (citing Diego O. Castro, “Hot Blood and Easy Virtue”: Mass Media and
the Making of Latino/A Stereotypes, in IMAGES OF COLOR, IMAGES OF CRIME 135
(Coramae Richey Mann & Marjorie S. Zatz eds., 1998)); FARAGHER, supra note 75
(documenting the use of lynching to punish and terrorize Latinx people in Los Angeles
and Northern California).
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Recent research has documented additional ways in which race infects
capital decisionmaking. Similarly, studies of jury decisions find evidence of
racial bias. Benjamin Fleury-Steiner and Victor Argothy analyzed Capital
Jury Project juror interviews from capital cases involving Latinx defendants
in Texas and California. The scholars examined responses in which jurors
in Latinx defendant death cases referred to the defendant’s or the family of
the defendant’s appearance and courtroom behavior. The intention was to
evaluate how jurors “drew on cultural understandings of Latinx identity in
describing their punishment decisions.”92 In one exchange, a juror described
the defendant’s family in the courtroom in a manner that invoked
stereotypes of “threatening Latinos,” thereby silently “locating the defendant
among the ‘hard looking Hispanic’ group.”93 The scholars observed that
“[j]udging a defendant they know nothing or very little about, former white
and Latin[x] capital jurors import . . . a racialized discourse from the
outside in.”94
Researchers have consistently found racial disparities in jury selection
in capital trials throughout the United States.95 The most recent study
examined race-based juror selection in trials held from 1992 to 2017 in
Mississippi’s Fifth Circuit Court District and found racial disparities in
peremptory strike decisions, even after controlling for race-neutral factors.96
A team of data experts and reporters analyzed juror responses in thirteen
capital trials using about sixty-five different variables, including the juror’s

92.
93.
94.

95.
96.

Fleury-Steiner & Argothy, supra note 91, at 74 (describing the analytical focus of the
research).
Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 80. In related research, Cynthia Willis-Esqueda and Russ K.E. Espinoza found
that European American mock jurors recommended the death penalty significantly
more often for low socioeconomic status Latinx defendants in a weak mitigation
evidence condition. Russ K.E. Espinoza & Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, The Influence of
Mitigation Evidence, Ethnicity, and SES on Death Penalty Decisions by European
American and Latino Venire Persons, 21 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY
PSYCHOL. 288 (2015). Additionally, Justin Levinson found that death-qualified jurors—
those who are neither categorically opposed to capital punishment nor believing that a
death penalty must be imposed in all instances of capital murder—harbored stronger
racial biases than jurors excluded on these bases. Justin D. Levinson et al., Devaluing
Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death
Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2014).
See Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials,
97 IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012) (collecting studies).
WILL CRAFT, PEREMPTORY STRIKES IN MISSISSIPPI’S FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT DISTRICT, APM
REPORTS (2018), https://www.apmreports.org/files/peremptory_strike_methodology.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BGA-3VWK].
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race, whether the juror was accused of a crime, and whether the juror was
hesitant about the death penalty. These researchers estimated a logistic
regression model to determine the odds that individual variables affected the
likelihood that a juror was removed by a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge.
The report determined that a black juror in a capital murder trial was 8.65
times more likely to be struck than a similarly situated white juror. In fact,
“[b]eing Black was the greatest predictor of being struck in capital trials,
even more than expressing hesitation about imposing the death penalty.”97
Experimental evidence shows much of the same bias shown in the actual
juror studies.98
Race may also infect capital decision making before the selection of
jurors, as early as the arrest of a suspect by police. A recent study examines
homicides reported in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Supplementary
Homicide Reports between 1976 and 2009, finding that homicides with
white victims were more likely to be cleared by the arrest of a suspect than
homicides with nonwhite victims. The study also finds that counties with
large nonwhite populations have lower clearance rates than predominantly
white counties.99 Racial disparities in police responses to potentially deatheligible murders raise serious doubts as to whether the death penalty can be
equitably applied. If implicit bias in police agencies produces a biased pool
of death-eligible defendants, the race-infected charging and prosecution of
death-eligible defendants is likely to multiply those biases.100
In the past decade, research on racial disparities has been dispositive of
constitutionally impermissible practices in charging and sentencing under
state constitutional law. The Connecticut Supreme Court relied on
empirical evidence of racial disparities in charging and sentencing to find
the death penalty statute in that state to be infected by invidious racial

Id. at 12.
Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge
Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007) (reviewing the literature and presenting
new research).
99. Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Police, Race, and the Production of Capital Homicides,
24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 261, 266 (2019).
100. See Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing
Act be Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?,
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 777, 793–94 (1990) (discussing how the composition
of cases produced by police can multiply the biases of prosecutors and jurors in
charging and sentencing death-eligible cases).
97.
98.
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discrimination, ruling it unconstitutional in 2015.101
Similarly, the
Washington Supreme Court invalidated the state death penalty statute based
on empirical research showing that death sentences were imposed in an
arbitrary and racially biased manner in violation of state constitutional law.102

IV.

DATA AND METHODS

This Article reports the second set of findings from a research project
designed to evaluate the extent to which the California death penalty law
satisfies the constitutional narrowing requirements.103 The earlier research
concludes that the enormous breadth of California’s statutory special
circumstances combined with the state’s extremely low death-sentencing
rate among death-eligible cases fails to comply with Furman’s narrowing
requirement.104 This Article focuses on the application of individual special
circumstances and evaluates the extent to which special circumstances apply
disparately to defendants by race or ethnicity. Such racial and ethnic
heterogeneity in death eligibility only rarely has been identified, but clearly
was on the minds of the Furman majority.105 This analysis is essential to

101. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 70 (Conn. 2015) (“[F]our members of this court likewise
have concluded that the degree of factfinder discretion required by the federal
constitution means that the death penalty in Connecticut has been and inevitably will
continue to be imposed with a degree of discrimination that is impermissible under the state
constitution . . . . [I]nvidious discrimination . . . pave[s] a smoother path to execution for
a subset of the population.”) (italics and citations omitted). In a subsequent 2015
opinion, the Connecticut Supreme Court denied a stay and allowed the ban on capital
punishment to apply retroactively. State v. Santiago, 125 A.3d 520 (Conn. 2015).
The court relied on evidence provided by John J. Donohue, who studied the 205
death-eligible murders that led to homicide convictions in Connecticut from 1973–
2007. See Donohue, supra note 72, at 641. Donohue found statistically significant
evidence that minority defendants who kill white people are more likely to receive a
death sentence than white defendants in comparable cases. Id. at 647–50. Donohue’s
findings speak to overbreadth as well as race discrimination. He found that only one of
the nine death sentences sustained during the study period actually fell among the most
egregious death-eligible cases. For the eight other cases in which defendants were
sentenced to death, the median number of equally egregious death-eligible cases in
which the defendant did not receive a death sentence was thirty-five or forty-six,
depending on the measure of egregiousness used. Id. at 676–79.
102. State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 627 (Wash. 2018). The Washington Supreme Court
relied on evidence provided by Katherine Beckett and Heather Evans showing that
jurors are between 3.5 and 4.6 times more likely to impose a death sentence when the
defendant is black. Id. at 633; Beckett & Evans, supra note 72 at 101–04.
103. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2019).
104. Baldus et al., supra note 10.
105. See, e.g., Thaxton, supra note 85.
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identify the extent of the limitations—if not failures—of states to satisfy Furman’s
narrowing requirement.
A.

The Universe and Sample of Cases

To conduct our analysis of the narrowing effect of California’s postFurman law, we examined the universe defined as all defendants convicted
of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter,
using a machine-readable database produced by the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).106 This database includes
information on 27,453 cases with a date of offense between January 1, 1978,
and June 30, 2002.107 The database includes 32 percent first-degree murder
cases, 29 percent second-degree murder cases, and 39 percent voluntary
manslaughter cases.
From this universe, we derived a 6.9 percent (1,900/27,453) sample.
We stratified the sample on three dimensions to produce a more
representative sample of the cases than would have been produced by a
random sampling method. The first dimension, the crime of conviction,
provides proportionate representation for first-degree, second-degree, and
voluntary manslaughter conviction cases.
The second dimension is the population density of the county of
prosecution.108 We designed this dimension with four levels to obtain a
representative sample of smaller and more rural counties. Our goal was to
include 25 percent of the sample from Los Angeles (which accounts for 42
percent of the cases in the universe) and 25 percent of the sample from each
of the three other groups of counties ranked in terms of population
density.109

106. The state was directed by the federal district courts in the underlying habeas corpus
proceedings to produce the database used to construct the stratified random sample and
probation reports for the cases that we identified as part of the sample.
107. For each case, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
database includes information on the date of offense, crime of conviction, county of
prosecution, county court case number, CDCR case number, date of conviction, and
the gender and age of the defendant.
108. County population per square mile was calculated by the authors for the year 2000
using the following data source: CAL. DEP’T OF FINANCE, CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, SEC. A, TABLE A-1 (county land square miles), SEC. B, TABLE B-3 (county
population) (2001).
109. The counties in the four population density levels from low (1) to high (4) density are
as follows. Level 1 has forty-one counties with a population density per square mile of
fewer than 200 people: Alpine, Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Del Norte, El
Dorado, Fresno, Glenn, Humboldt, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Kings, Lake, Lassen, Madera,
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For the third dimension, we stratified the sample based on four time
periods that would enable us to overrepresent cases from the Carlos
Window,110 during which time the two habeas corpus petitioners raising the
narrowing challenge to the California statute were sentenced to death. Our goal
was to create a sample with 57 percent of the cases from this time period.
Our methods produced a stratified random sample of cases consisting
of forty-eight strata: three offense categories by four county population
density categories by four time periods. For each stratum, we weighted the
cases in the sample based on the ratio of the number of cases in the universe
and the sample. For example, if a stratum contained one hundred cases in the
universe and twenty cases in the sample, the weight for each case in the sample
from that stratum would be 5.0 (100/20).
Table 1 presents the final sample and estimated universe, by conviction
and by sentence outcome. Each row of information includes the number of
cases in the 1,900-case sample and in the 27,453-case estimated universe.
Row 1 reports that the sample includes 61 death-sentenced cases, 193
resulting in life without parole (LWOP), and 1,646 resulting in a sentence
less than LWOP. Rows 2–4 report the distribution of these sentencing
outcomes by conviction. Column F reports that 764 of the cases in the
sample resulted in a first-degree murder conviction, 491 in a second-degree
murder conviction, and 645 in a voluntary manslaughter conviction.

Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Napa, Nevada, Placer,
Plumas, San Benito, San Bernardino, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Shasta, Sierra,
Siskiyou, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Yolo, and Yuba. Level 2 has nine
counties with a population per square mile larger than 200 and smaller than 700:
Marin, Riverside, San Diego, San Joaquin, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, and
Ventura. Level 3 has seven counties with a population per square mile between 700
and 3,400 people: Alameda, Contra Costa, Orange, Sacramento, San Francisco, San
Mateo, and Santa Clara. Level 4 is Los Angeles.
110. See supra note 50–51 and accompanying text (providing details on the legal basis for
the Carlos Window and providing details on the underlying legal cases). The four time
periods are January 1, 1978 to December 11, 1983, December 12, 1983 to October 13,
1987 (the Carlos Window), October 14, 1987 to December 31, 1992, and January 1,
1993 to June 30, 2002.
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Table 1: Description of the Sample by Sentence Outcome
A

Total
First-degree
murder
conviction
Second-degree
murder
conviction
Voluntary
manslaughter
conviction

B.

B

Sample
Weighted
Sample
Weighted

C
Death
%
n
3%
61
3%
705
8%
61
8%
705

D
LWOP
%
n
10%
193
9%
2,364
25%
193
27%
2,364

E
Term of Years
%
n
87%
1,646
89%
24,384
67%
510
65%
5,642

F
Total
n
1,900
27,453
764
8,711

Sample
Weighted

-

0
0

-

0
0

100%
100%

491
7,900

491
7,900

Sample
Weighted

-

0
0

-

0
0

100%
100%

645
10,842

645
10,842

Data Sources for Cases

The primary source of information on each case was the probation
report prepared by the county probation officer with jurisdiction over the
case. California law requires the preparation of a probation report for each
homicide regardless of the crime of conviction and sentence.111 The purpose
of the report is to justify the probation officer’s recommendation on the
appropriateness of probation as a sentencing alternative in the case. These
reports, routinely relied on by California courts, are subject to examination
and correction by both the prosecuting authorities and defendants.112
One limitation of the probation reports is that they are often prepared
pretrial so that the ultimate crime of conviction may not be noted in the
report. When that occurred, we consulted the crime of conviction reported
in the CDCR database. On other occasions, the probation report contained
insufficient procedural information because it failed to report the crime
charged or the basis of the conviction (by guilty trial verdict or guilty plea) or
both, information that may be essential to assess the death eligibility of a case.
Some probation reports also included insufficient substantive
information about the facts of the crime. Missing procedural or substantive
information occurred in 16 percent of the cases for which we received a
probation report from the state. The Habeas Corpus Resource Center

111. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 2019).
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.01 (West 2019).
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(HCRC) cured the insufficiency in 106 cases, thus reducing the percentage
of cases with missing information to 11 percent.113
The state’s obligation to provide probation reports was defined by court
orders. Some reports, however, were not produced by the state or contained
no usable information. When we encountered these situations, we replaced
the probation report with a substitute report that was randomly selected
from the sampling lists.
C.

The Coding Process for Individual Cases

Each case was coded into the data collection instrument (DCI) based
primarily on the probation reports. The information in the probation
reports provided the basis for the final coding decisions unless an
information insufficiency was present and we obtained additional
information from HCRC. We also consulted appellate judicial opinions
where applicable. The coding of the DCI was conducted by thirteen University of
Iowa law students and eight recent University of Iowa law graduates.114
The DCI documents charging and sentencing decisions and, if the case
was capitally charged, any special circumstances alleged, found, or rejected.
It further documents any sentencing outcomes reported in the probation
report. The DCI also assesses liability for first-degree murder and the
factual presence of each special circumstance under pre-Furman Georgia
law, post-Furman Carlos Window California law, and 2008 California law.115
A final section of the DCI summarizes the coder’s judgment of each case’s
death eligibility under each of the three legal regimes. We evaluate the
application of special circumstances in this Article under the third regime—
2008 California law.

113. The Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC) represented one of the underlying
petitioners in the federal habeas corpus proceedings. HCRC consulted trial and
appellate court records in the case and reported the missing information if it was
available. When the HCRC was able to provide us with documents containing the
information needed about a case, it was coded accordingly, and the case was returned
to the active sample of cases.
114. The University of Iowa law students were Sadad Ali, Peter D’Angelo, John Magana,
Jacob Natwick, Fangzhou Ping, Thomas Farrens, Folke Simons, Erin Snider, Jason
Stoddard, James Vaglio, Porntiwa Wijitgomen, Fei Yu, and Weiyan Zhang. The recent
law graduates were Rebecca Bowman, Edward Broders, Theresa Dvorak, David
Franker, Luke Hannan, Beth Moffett, Amanda Stahle, and Kristen Stoll.
115. See infra Part II for a discussion of each time period.
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Identifying Liability for First-Degree Murder and the Factual
Presence of Special Circumstances in the Cases

The HCRC provided a detailed summary of the law concerning the
elements of murder liability to the Iowa coding team.116 When legal
questions arose under the terms of the coding protocol, the coders certified
legal questions to HCRC counsel to which HCRC replied in writing.
We applied two core principles of interpretation to assess the factual
death eligibility of each case. The first principle is the controlling factfinding
rule, which limits the coders’ discretion to override authoritative fact
findings of juries and judges in particular cases.117 The rule stipulates that if
an authoritative fact finder (judge or jury) with responsibility for finding a
defendant liable for first-degree murder convicts the defendant of seconddegree murder or voluntary manslaughter, that finding is considered to be a
controlling fact and the coder must code the case at the reduced level of
homicidal liability in the absence of overwhelming evidence of jury
nullification. The rule also holds that an authoritative fact finding of firstdegree murder or a first-degree murder guilty plea is a controlling fact, and
the case will be coded at that level of liability. The same rule applies with
respect to allegations and findings of the presence or absence of special
circumstances in the case and defendant admissions of their presence.118
The second core principle of interpretation, known as the legal
sufficiency standard, assesses whether a California appellate court would
affirm a jury conviction for first-degree murder or a jury’s finding of the
presence of a special circumstance in the case if a jury had made either of
those findings and the finding was challenged on appeal for a lack of
sufficient evidence. In the application of this principle, exculpatory evidence
offered by the defendant is given no weight, but incriminating evidence
offered by the defendant is credited.

116. These summaries were provided to the California Attorney General’s Office, which
represents California in federal habeas corpus proceedings, and were also entered into
evidence at the evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court in Ashmus v. Wong,
No. 3:93-cv-00594-TEH (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1993).
117. David Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner & Catherine
M. Grosso, Empirical Studies of Race and Geographic Discrimination in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: A Primer on the Key Methodological Issues, in THE
FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH 153, 164–65 (C. Lanier, W. Bowers & J. Acker eds.,
2009) (explaining the rationale of the controlling factfinding rule).
118. Prosecutors are not viewed as controlling fact finders in the same way as jurors and judges.
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Coders relied on three forms of authority to support their judgments
on whether the facts satisfied the legal sufficiency test. The strongest level of
authority was a factually comparable case in which a jury or trial court’s
first-degree murder or special circumstance finding of fact was sustained or
reversed by a California appellate court when challenged with a claim of
evidentiary insufficiency. The second level of authority was a factually
comparable case in this study in which a fact finder returned a finding of fact
on first-degree murder liability or the presence of a special circumstance that
was not disturbed on appeal. The third level of authority was the case law and
legal memorandum provided by HCRC.
We measured the presence of individual special circumstances under
each of the three legal regimes. (The analysis in this Article relies on the
assessments under 2008 California law.) Coding assessments allowed coders
to identify situations in which the presence of a special circumstance was a
close call. Close call classifications arose when the special circumstance
classification was not determined by a controlling finding of fact and the
circumstances of the offense were not sufficiently well understood to
support clear coding. When we were uncertain how an appellate court
would rule on finding a special circumstance in the case, we coded it a close call.
These distinctions produced two measures of death eligibility—a
conservative measure that limited death eligibility to clearly present
classifications and a liberal measure that classified a case as death eligible if
that status was either clearly present or a close call. For the purposes of this
Article, we rely only on the liberal measure. That is, the analysis below
considers a special circumstance present when the coders coded it as clearly
present or found a close call.119
2.

Coding Defendant and Victim Race and Ethnicity

Limited and missing information for race or ethnicity presented a
significant issue in this study. The original sources used to code this
database did not regularly report race or ethnicity of the defendants or the
name, race, or ethnicity of the victims. The coders were instructed to code
race and ethnicity when it was available in the probation reports. HCRC
consulted trial and appellate court records and identified victim names, and
defendant and victim race and ethnicity, where available. As a starting
119. In Baldus et al., supra note 10, we note these distinctions and report both the
conservative and liberal estimates. They did not make a substantive difference in
that analysis.
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point, the initial coding here reflects all the limitations in the race or
ethnicity designations by the court and prison officials.120
The initial coding process identified 81 percent of defendant race or
ethnicity (1,546/1,900) but only 33 percent of victim race or ethnicity
(630/1,900). As noted, the probation reports often omitted victim name,
race, and ethnicity. This was particularly true for second-degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter cases.
In 2018, we employed seven Columbia Law School students to search
for missing victim names.121 The students were provided lists including
defendant names, county, sentencing and offense dates, and case numbers.
We instructed them to find the missing names using internet search engines,
online newspapers local to the underlying homicide, Westlaw, Lexis, the
California Department of Corrections websites, and San Francisco
Homicides, 1849–1993, compiled by Kevin J. Mullen at the Ohio State
University Criminal Justice Research Center.122 This effort identified
missing victim names in 134 cases, leaving 129 cases with no information on
the name of the victim.
With a more complete list of names, our next step was to estimate
missing race by applying a verified and commonly used method that assigns
the probability of a person being a particular race or ethnicity using census
data.123 The U.S. Census Bureau used self-reported race or ethnicity data to
120. See Urbina, supra note 75, at 247 (2004) (“Not all states keep race and ethnicity of
inmates under a sentence of death, other than ‘whites’ and ‘blacks,’ and most states do
not differentiate between the different Latino groups. Record-keeping methods also
vary widely across states. As a result, information on Latinos, especially for specific
Latino groups, is scant and unreliable.”); see also Barbara O’Brien, Klara Stephens,
Maurice Possley, & Catherine M. Grosso, Latinx Defendants, False Convictions, and the
Difficult Road to Exoneration, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1682 (2019).
121. The Columbia Law School student researchers were Greg Bernstein, Melissa Castillo,
Ed Costikyan, Andrew Howard, Mary Marshall, Olivia Morrison, and Andrew Pai.
122. Available from the authors upon request.
123. The current analysis used the 2010 Census surname list B. See UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU, FREQUENTLY OCCURRING SURNAMES FROM THE CENSUS 2010, FILE B: SURNAMES
OCCURRING 100 OR MORE TIMES (2010), https://www.census.gov/topics/population/
genealogy/data/2010_surnames.html [https://perma.cc/Q2V6-A6M4].
This method has been applied and accepted to identify Hispanic ethnicity in a 2013
case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging racial discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, Doc. 579 at 79, Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D.
Ariz. 2013) (No. 07-CV-02513). “Dr. Taylor’s statistics in this respect were, apparently,
more sophisticated than those provided in the 1980 census list of Spanish surnames.”
Id. at 79 n.69.
Dr. Taylor relied on independent U.S. Census data correlating the likelihood that a
person with any given name self-identified as Hispanic. He did a differential analysis

Death by Stereotype

1425

compile a list of over 160,000 surnames occurring one hundred or more
times from the 2010 Census. Combining these names with the self-reports
of race and ethnicity, the Census Bureau computed the probability of a
person living in the United States with that name being white, black, Native
American or Pacific Islander, Asian, or Latinx.124 Studies comparing this
procedure with other algorithms for assigning race or ethnicity suggest
comparably high accuracy, sensitivity, and positive predictive value when
compared with self-reports.125
For each of these racial or ethnic groups, we coded the classifications at
three levels of probability: 60, 75, or 90 percent. There were no overlaps; that
is, if a person’s name had a probability of 60 percent or more of being Latinx, they
had no other probability above 60 percent. Accordingly, that person was
classified as Latinx. We did the same for each of the other categories.
Persons whose names did not meet the 60 percent threshold for any of the
population groups were coded as missing on the race or ethnicity variable.
Our main estimates of race and ethnicity effects for defendants used the 60
percent classification threshold. At this threshold, we reduced the rate of
missing defendant race to 4 percent (81 cases).126 The other thresholds were
used in sensitivity analyses.
Even after undertaking this level of effort to identify the missing
information, however, we continued to have 20 percent missing information
for victim race or ethnicity (400 cases) at the 60 percent probability level.127

124.
125.

126.
127.

that focused particularly on names whose owners identified as Hispanic more than 90
percent of the time, more than 80 percent of the time, and more than 70 percent of the
time. He also included names whose owners self-identified as Hispanic at a 60 percent
threshold as “a type of robustness analysis.”
Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 123.
See Mikhail Bautin & Steven Skiena, Concordance-Based Entity-Oriented Search, 7 WEB
INTELLIGENCE & AGENT SYS.: AN INT’L J. 303 (2009); Francis P. Boscoe et al., Heuristic
Algorithms for Assigning Hispanic Ethnicity, PLOS ONE, Feb. 2013, at 1,
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0055689 [https://perma.cc/SU8C-VDJV]; see
also David L. Word et al., Demographic Aspects of Surnames from Census 2000
(2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.192.3093&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/7LPK-SY3R];
Anurag Ambekar et al., Name-Ethnicity Classification from Open Sources, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 49–58 (2009), https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/
~skiena/ lydia/names.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7CL-JY6H].
The 75 percent threshold yielded 9 percent missing (173 cases), and the 90 percent
threshold yielded 14 percent missing (267 cases).
The 75 percent threshold yielded 36 percent missing (686 cases), and the 90 percent
threshold yielded 50 percent missing (965 cases).
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V.

FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE REACH
OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Table 2 presents the study sample and weighted universe by conviction
(in rows) and race and ethnicity of the defendant (in columns). The top row
presents the sample overall, with the next three rows showing the
distribution among first- and second-degree murder and voluntary
manslaughter cases. Columns A, B, and C show that black, white, and
Latinx defendants compose roughly equal and large portions of the sample,
and combined account for 92 percent of the sample.
Table 2: Description of the Sample by Race or Ethnicity of Defendant
and Conviction

VM conviction

M2 conviction

M1 conviction

Total

A
Black

B
White

C
Latinx

D
Other

E
Missing

F
Total

Sample

26%

498

37%

696

28%

540

4%

80

4%

86

1,900

Weighted

30%

8,374

29%

7,873

33%

9,030

4%

1,178

3%

999

27,453

Sample

28%

212

39%

301

24%

184

4%

29

5%

36

764

Weighted

33%

2,486

31%

2,595

27%

2,269

5%

391

5%

382

8,711

Sample

21%

103

39%

192

30%

146

5%

26

5%

25

491

Weighted

26%

2,041

31%

2,430

35%

2,760

5%

397

3%

272

7,900

Sample

28%

183

31%

203

33%

210

4%

25

4%

25

645

Weighted

32%

3,436

25%

2,762

36%

3,934

4%

390

3%

320

10,842

Note: Rows and columns may not sum to total due to weighting.

We next estimate the scope of the special circumstances identified in
the California statute by race and ethnicity. Although many of the special
circumstances appear to apply evenly across race and ethnicity, we identified
six that do not. The analyses below focus on those six circumstances—
multiple victims,128 lying in wait,129 robbery/burglary,130 torture,131 drive-by
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(3) (West 2019).
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(15) (West 2019).
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shooting,132 and gang membership133—and identify racial and ethnic disparities
associated with each. The results demonstrate how the California death
penalty statute’s expansive special circumstances not only fail to
meaningfully narrow death eligibility but also do so in a manner that applies
to defendants of some races or ethnicities differently than others.
We base our conclusions on four levels of analysis presented in three
Subparts. Part V.A presents the simple distribution of the cases in which
each of the six special circumstances is found or present by race or ethnicity.
Part V.B focuses more sharply on the risk faced by each race or ethnicity
regardless of the number of cases in the study. The results report the
percent of the total cases in which each special circumstance is present or
found for each race or ethnicity. Neither of these results consider the
possibility that relative culpability of cases would explain the disparate
application of the special circumstance. Part V.C presents the results of two
sets of analysis in which we introduce culpability and time controls.

130. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(17)(A) & (17)(G) (West 2019). Although these two special
circumstances may be separately charged and found, given the overlapping nature of
the two, we combined them for the purposes of this Article.
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(18) (West 2019).
132. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(21) (West 2019).
133. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(22) (West 2019).
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Table 3: Sample Distribution by Race and Selected Special Circumstances

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Special Circumstance
Representation in
the Sample Overall
Multiple Victims
(p < .04)
Lying in Wait
(n.s.)
Robbery/Burglary
(p < .01)
Torture
(p < .01)
Drive-by Shooting
(p < .02)
Gang Membership
(p < .001)

Black
30%
498
8,374
24%
25
396
27%
134
2,188
43%
160
2,400
24%
42
570
30%
21
365
32%
46
990

White
29%
696
7,873
34%
55
544
29%
236
2,363
26%
166
1,462
44%
96
1,027
6%
8
71
6%
8
199

Latinx
33%
540
9,029
23%
32
366
37%
188
3,014
24%
97
1,338
19%
35
455
53%
26
633
57%
69
1,756

Other
4%
80
1,177
10%
6
160
4%
21
289
3%
16
179
6%
13
150
8%
4
99
4%
5
125

Unknown
3%
86
942
9%
10
149
3%
24
244
5%
17
260
6%
13
132
3%
2
35
1%
1
27

Total
1,900
27,453
128
1,616
603
8,098
456
5,639
199
2,334
61
1,203
129
3,097

Each column presents representation rate, then number of observations, and
finally weighted count. The statistical significance value reports the corrected
weighted Pearson chi square statistic from Stata survey tabulate for each line of
the table.

A.

Distribution of Cases in Select Special Circumstances
by Race or Ethnicity

Table 3 lists these special circumstances and presents the distribution of
the cases in the sample and the weighted universe by race or ethnicity for
each one. The first row presents the overall distribution of cases in the
sample from Table 2. This distribution provides one useful point of
comparison to the distribution of individual special circumstances in the
remaining rows of the table. Rows 2–7 present the distributions among
cases where each special circumstance was present or found.
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Row 2 shows that white defendants represent 34 percent of the cases
involving multiple victims,134 whereas black defendants represent 24 percent
and Latinx 23 percent of the cases. The white defendant representation is
higher than the white defendant representation in the study and statistically
significantly higher than the representation of other race or ethnicities in the
study (p < .04). Row 5 shows a similar but greater disparity among cases in
which the torture special circumstance was found or present.135 White
defendant cases compose 44 percent of this population, compared to 24
percent of black defendants and 19 percent of Latinx defendants. The white
defendant representation in cases where this special circumstance is present
or found is more than twice that of black and Latinx defendants, in contrast
to the roughly equal representation in the study overall.
Row 4 combines cases in which the special circumstance for robbery or
burglary was found or present.136 Here, black defendant cases represent a
disproportionate share of the cases, at 43 percent, compared to 26 percent
for white defendant cases and 24 percent for Latinx defendant cases. Black
defendants are overrepresented in these felony-murder cases in comparison
to their representation in the study in row 1 (43 percent versus 30 percent).
Rows 6 and 7 present the most recent special circumstances, those
marking cases involving drive-by shootings137 and gang membership.138
Latinx defendants represent more than one-half of the cases in which either
of these special circumstances were present or found. More precisely, Latinx
defendants represent 53 percent of cases with evidence of a drive-by
shooting and 57 percent of cases where the defendant was involved in a
criminal street gang. This substantial overrepresentation dwarfs the
significantly underrepresented white defendants with a ratio of 8–9: 1 (57
percent/6 percent or 53 percent/6 percent).139

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (West 2019).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 2019).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(A) & (G) (West 2019).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(21) (West 2019).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(22) (West 2019).
The discussion and tables in the remainder of the Article present only weighted
analyses for ease of presentation. The complete Table 4 above provides a reference
point to the size of the underlying sample and the importance of the weights.
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Rate at Which Select Special Circumstances Are Present or Found
by Defendant Race or Ethnicity

Table 4 and Figure 1 present the unadjusted rate at which select special
circumstances are found or present controlling for race or ethnicity (the
“application rate”). This application rate provides a standard measure of the
disparity between the frequency with which each race or ethnicity appears in
the overall study and the frequency with which it is present or found in cases
with each special circumstance. The measurement of interest is the percent
of the cases in each race or ethnicity in which a given special circumstance is
present or found. Unadjusted means these findings do not take into
consideration, or control for, the relative culpability of the cases.
Table 4: Application Rates: Unadjusted Rate at Which Special Circumstances
Are Present or Found, by Defendant Race or Ethnicity

Multiple Victims
Lying in Wait
Robbery/Burglary
Torture
Drive-by Shooting
Gang Membership
Totals

%
5%
26%
29%
7%
4%
12%

Black
n
396
2,188
2,400
570
365
990
8,374

%
7%
30%
19%
13%
1%
2%

White
n
544
2,363
1,462
1,027
71
199
7,873

%
4%
33%
15%
5%
7%
19%

Latinx
n
366
3,014
1,338
455
633
1,756
9,030

p-value
< .04
n.s.
< .01
< .02
< .01
< .01

Each row in the table reports the application rate for each race or ethnicity (number
of cases with that defendant race or ethnicity in which the special circumstance was
present or found divided by the total number of cases with a defendant of that race or
ethnicity) as reported in a crosstab of the special circumstance and a race variable
that separately coded black, white, Latinx, other, and missing. The total defendants
by race or ethnicity are reported in row 7. The p-value is based on the chi2.
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Figure 1: Application of Special Circumstance by Defendant Race or Ethnicity

Figure 1 presents the data in Table 4 graphically, showing three bar
graphs for each special circumstance, one each for the application rate for
black, white, and Latinx defendants. The first set of columns presents
application rates by race and ethnicity for cases in which the multiplevictims special circumstance was found or present. The first column reports
that 5 percent of black defendant cases have this special circumstance
present or found. The second column reports that 7 percent of white
defendant cases include this special circumstance. The third column reports
that 4 percent of Latinx defendant cases have evidence that the multiplevictims special circumstance was found or present. The underlying numbers for
each set of columns appears in Table 4.
These application rates do not account for the culpability of the
defendant in the case or the year the case originated. They are unadjusted
fractions. Nonetheless, the sets of columns from left to right make clear that
race and ethnicity matter. Note that white defendants have the highest
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application rate in the first row in Table 4 and first set of columns in Figure
1 for the multiple-victims special circumstance finding and in the fourth row
and fourth set of columns for the torture special circumstance finding.
Black defendants have the highest application rate in only the third row
and third set of cases which combine cases with the felony aggravator for
burglary and robbery. Here, black defendants, at 29 percent (2,400/8,374),
face a rate almost twice as high as that of Latinx defendants, at 15 percent
(1,338/9,030), and one and one-half times as high as that of white
defendants, at 19 percent (1,462/7,873). This finding is consistent with the
overrepresentation of black defendants in cases with these special
circumstances presented above.
Latinx defendants face the highest application rates in the remaining
three sets of columns. The fifth and sixth sets of columns present
application rates for the drive-by shooting and street gang murder special
circumstances, in which Latinx defendant cases represent the majority of
cases. Even when controlling for representation, these special circumstances
affect Latinx defendants at a statistically significantly higher rate than black
or white defendants.
The drive-by shooting special circumstance was present or found in 7
percent of Latinx defendant cases (633/9,030), compared to 4 percent of
black defendant cases (365/8,374) and less than 1 percent of white defendant
cases (71/7,873). The street gang murder circumstance was present or found
in 19 percent of Latinx defendant cases (1,756/9,030), compared to 12
percent of black defendant cases (990/8,374) and less than 2 percent of white
defendant cases (199/7,873).
Finally, our earlier research showed the lying-in-wait special
circumstance to expand the reach of the death penalty more than any other
special circumstance.140 The application rates by race or ethnicity are closer for
this special circumstance, but Latinx defendants again face the highest rate at 33
percent (3,014/9,030), compared to 30 percent for white defendants (2,363/7,873)
and 26 percent for black defendants (2,188/8,374).
The analysis to this point suggested that the selected special
circumstances applied disparately by race and ethnicity.141 It remained
possible, however, that the disparity could be explained by the relative

140. Baldus et. al, supra note 10, at 729 & n.122.
141. We replicated the analysis presented above but limited the universe to factually firstdegree murder cases. While application rates were slightly lower, the disparities
remained constant. Similarly, we replicated the analyses using race of defendant estimates
at the 75 percent and 90 percent thresholds and observed no meaningful differences.
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The following analyses introduce

Controlled Analyses of Disparate Application of Select Special
Circumstances by Race and Ethnicity

Part V.C presents two different methods of controlled analysis. The
first used logistic regression to control for alternate explanations, in this case
culpability. The second used what is commonly referred to as a doubly
robust estimation.142 In both sets of analysis, we introduce a five-level racepurged culpability scale to control for the underlying facts in each case.143
For the first analysis, we specified a simple logistic model for each
special circumstance identified to show disproportionate racial or ethnic
application in our unadjusted analyses. Logistic regressions provide
estimates of the odds that a special circumstance will be found or present for
a defendant of each race or ethnicity.144 Logistic regression is well-suited for
analysis of dichotomous outcomes, such as selection into a specific category
or program. The results show the log odds and 95 percent confidence
intervals of being selected into the category of interest, adjusted for the effects of

142. See Greg Ridgeway & John M. MacDonald, Doubly Robust Internal Benchmarking and
False Discovery Rates for Detecting Racial Bias in Police Stops, 104 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
661 (2009); Tamar Sofer et al., Control Function Assisted IPW Estimation with a
Secondary Outcome in Case-Control Studies, 27 STATISTICA SINICA 785 (2017).
143. We created the culpability scale in a multistep process. The scaling process begins by
producing a culpability index with a logistic model that generated a predicted
probability of a death sentence for each case. This model included variables for the fact
of four special circumstances being found or present. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(3)
(multiple victims), § 190.2(5) (for the purpose of avoiding arrest), § 190.2(10) (witness
victim), and § 190.2(16) (victim race motive)], the number of special circumstances in
the case, kidnapping, that defendant was not the killer, the presence of coperpetrators,
and a scale for the age of the defendant. The model produced a predicted probability of
a death sentence for each pre-Furman case. Those cases were ranked according to
those predictions and divided into a five-level culpability scale. We then estimated a
racial disparity within each cell and combined those disparities to compute a weighted
average of the disparities across all the cells. This was used to purge the race effects
from the index. The Mantel-Haenszel test is the procedure we use to create these
overall estimates. See Nathan Mantel & William Haenszel, Statistical Aspects of the Analysis
of Data from Retrospective Studies of Disease, 22 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 719 (1959) (establishing
this method).
144. See generally DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION
(2nd ed. 2000); see also SCOTT MENARD, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS (2002)
(discussing the assumptions of a logistic regression model and its difference from
ordinary multiple (least squares) regression models).
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other variables entered into the regression. The odds ratio for each predictor is its
exponentiated coefficient.
The model defined the special circumstance as the outcome measure and
included the culpability scale, a fixed effect for offense year, three distinct race or
ethnicity variables (identifying black defendants, Latinx defendants, and white
defendants), and one variable identifying black and Latinx defendants
together.145 We also included a variable measuring the presence of at least
one white victim in this analysis when possible.146 We then specified the
model by removing any variable that was not at least marginally
statistically significant in the model, starting with the variable the farthest
from significance and stopping when all variables showed significance.
The culpability scale remained highly statistically significant throughout
the analysis.
Table 5: Race Disparities by Special Circumstance, Controlling for Culpability
A
Special Circumstance
1
2
3
4
5

Multiple Victims

6

Drive-by Shooting
(model 2)
Gang Membership

7

Lying in Wait
Robbery & Burglary
Torture
Drive-by Shooting
(model 1)

B
Freq.147
1,616
8,098
5,639
2,334
1,203
1,203
3,097

C
Race of
Defendant
Latinx
Latinx
Black
White
Latinx &
Black
Latinx

D
Odds
Ratio
0.4
1.6
2.2
2.3
3.5

E
St.
Err.
0.20
0.30
0.42
0.57
1.6

F
95% conf.
int.
(0.2, 1.1)
(0.9, 1.9)
(1.5, 3.2)
(1.4, 4.3)
(1.3, 7.7)

G
pvalue
= .10
< .02
< .01
< .01
< .01

2.5

1.0

(1.2, 5.0)

< .02

Latinx
Black

7.8
4.8

2.9
2.0

(3.7, 16.2)
(2.1, 10.8)

< .01
< .01

Each line presents findings from a separate logistic regression model with a single
special circumstance as the outcome variable.

145. We evaluated the importance of controlling for county by replicating the analysis for
Los Angeles County alone and the study without Los Angeles County cases. Neither
analysis produced meaningfully different results. This is not surprising as the study
design considered county carefully. See explanation in text and note supra note 109.
146. This analysis set the missing information to zero. Doing so undercounted the presence
of cases with at least one white victim. Even then, this analysis was only possible on a
limited basis. Recall that race of defendant and two special circumstances (multiple
victims and gang membership) are statistically significantly related to the likelihood of
missing the race of the victim.
147. Frequency reports the number of cases in the estimated universe recorded as having
this special circumstance found or present.
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Table 5 presents results from the analysis of each special circumstance
in which at least one race variable remained in the fully specified model.
Column A lists the special circumstances. These are the same special
circumstances presented in the unadjusted analysis. Column B presents the
frequency with which each special circumstance is present or found in the
study. Column C presents the race or ethnicity of defendants found to face
disparate treatment. Column D presents the odds ratio for the extent of
disparate treatment reported in column C, and columns E–G present
measures of significance. The results largely confirm the unadjusted findings.
A number of special circumstances apply disparately by race or
ethnicity, but not all point in the same direction. The largest disparities
concern the criminal gang member special circumstance in row 7. Both
Latinx and black defendants face a disparate exposure to this special
circumstance. A model of the likelihood that the gang member special
circumstance would be found or present reported that Latinx defendants
faced 7.8 times higher odds than other similarly situated defendants, and
black defendants faced 4.8 times higher odds that other similar situated
defendants, even after controlling for culpability and year.
Rows 5 and 6 reports two different models for the likelihood that the
drive-by shooting special circumstance would be found or present. In
model one, the combined variable for black and Latinx defendants faced
odds 3.5 times higher than the odds faced by similarly situated defendants of
other races or ethnicities. In model two, Latinx defendants alone faced
odds 2.5 times higher than similarly situated defendants of other races or
ethnicities.
Row 1 reports that Latinx defendants face less than half the odds of
having a multiple victim special circumstance found or present than other
similarly situated defendants. This finding is only marginally significant.
Row 2 shows, however, that by holding culpability constant, it becomes clear
that Latinx defendants face odds of having the special circumstance for lying
in wait found or present that are 1.6 times the odds of similarly situated
defendants of other races or ethnicities (p < .02).
Rows 3 and 4 report similarly sized disparities for different groups of
defendants. Row 3, reporting on the special circumstance for robbery or
burglary, shows that black defendants face odds 2.2 times higher than the
odds faced by other similarly situated defendants. Row 4, reporting on the
torture special circumstance, indicates that white defendants face odds 2.3
times higher than other similarly situated defendants.

1436

66 UCLA L. R EV. 1394 (2019)

We conducted additional tests for discrimination in the application of
the select special circumstances using four comparisons of race and ethnicity
effects.148 These “doubly robust” estimation tests use a first model to predict
“treatment” status and a second model that predicts outcomes based on the
adjusted probability of “treatment.” Here, race is regarded as a treatment, a
specification common in research on discrimination in law.149 Criticisms of
this approach indict its failure to address the conditions for counterfactual
causal reasoning, especially the problem of manipulability of the
independent variable and the sensitivity of estimates of discrimination to
assumptions about the role of race in decisions by legal actors.150 Beyond
that concern, Issa Kohler-Hausmann argues that race is more than a
counterfactual claim in estimating and explaining discrimination; race is a
complex concept that is fraught with social history, meaning, and relations
that complicate simple categorizations.151 This concern poses a daunting
challenge.
The doubly robust estimation method we apply addresses this concern
in a basic way by first decomposing “race” based on observable
characteristics that themselves reflect the attributions of social meaning that
a discriminating actor might apply, and then using those adjusted meanings
to predict disparity.152 This method measures the contribution of each
subject in one group, and that contribution is weighted for subjects in the
second group by the inverse of its selection probability into the sample.153 The
models estimate the effects of race on specific special circumstances being found
or present. The model applies Augmented Inverse Probability Weighting
(AIPW) to estimate the two stages of the analysis.154 The estimates of

148. See Ridgeway and MacDonald, supra note 142.
149. See, e.g., Joseph G. Altonji & Rebecca M. Blank, Race and Gender in the Labor
Market, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3143, 3192 (1999),
https://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/labchp/3-48.html [https://perma.cc/2C78-V9BT]; Devah
Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in
Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 184
(2008). See generally Christopher Winship & Steven L. Morgan, The Estimation of Causal Effects
From Observational Data, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 659 (1999).
150. Roland Neil & Christopher Winship, Methodological Challenges and Opportunities in
Testing for Racial Discrimination in Policing, 2 ANN. REV CRIMINOLOGY 73 (2019).
151. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal
Thinking in Detecting Race Discrimination, 113 NW. L. REV. 1163, 1172 (2019).
152. See, for example, Thaxton, supra note 85 for a similar statistical treatment of the effects
of race in disparities in capital punishment.
153. Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 142; Sofer et al., supra note 142.
154. Heejung Bang & James M. Robins, Doubly Robust Estimation in Missing Data and
Causal Inference Models, 61 BIOMETRICS 962 (2005); see also James R. Carpenter,
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disparities are shown as average treatment effects (ATE) for the differences
in the probability of application by race (or effect sizes) between the
reference and test categories.155
We estimate four models to identify specific forms of potential
discrimination.
The first model compares the presence of special
circumstances for white defendants compared to all other defendants. The
second compares white with black defendants, excluding other racial and
ethnic categories. The third compares white with Latinx defendants,
excluding all others. And the fourth compares white defendants to both
black and Latinx defendants, again excluding all others. Each model
estimates first the (inverse) probability of being white in this sample relative
to the reference group (others, black, Latinx, black or Latinx), and then the
probability of being found or present for each special circumstance. The
models also include as a parameter the culpability scale described above.156
Table 6 shows the results.

Michael G. Kenward & Stijn Vansteelandt, A Comparison of Multiple Imputation and
Doubly Robust Estimation for Analyses with Missing Data, 169 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y:
SERIES A (STATISTICS IN SOCIETY) 571 (2006); Michele Jonsson Funk et al., Doubly
Robust Estimation of Causal Effects, 173 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 761 (2011).
155. Alberto Abadie et al., Implementing Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects
in Stata, 4 STATA J. 290 (2004); see also Alberto Abadie & Guido W. Imbens, Large
Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects, 74
ECONOMETRICA 235 (2006); Keisuke Hirano, Guido W. Imbens, & Geert Ridder,
Efficient Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Using the Estimated Propensity Score,
71 ECONOMETRICA 1161 (2003).
156. Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 142; Sofer et al., supra note 142.
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Table 6: AIPW Estimates of Race and Ethnicity on Charging or Finding
of Specific Circumstances (ATE, SE, p)

Multiple Victims

Lying in Wait

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

White-Others

White-Black
Only

White-Latinx
Only

White-Black or
Latinx

-.009***

-.003

-.018***

-.011***

(.002)

(.002)

0.002

(.002)

-.010*

-.037***

-.029***

-0.002

(.006)

(.007)

(.007)

(.006)

.025***

.103***

.040***

.029***

Robbery/Burglary

(.005)

(.007)

(.006)

(.005)

-.065***

-.060***

-.081***

-.071***

Torture

(.004)

(.005)

(.004)

(.004)

.049***

.035***

.061***

.047***

Drive-By Shooting

(.002)

(.002)

(.003)

(.002)

.122***

.094***

.167***

.133***

Gang Membership

(.003)

(.004)

(.004)

(.003)

N

1,900

1,194

1,236

1,734

Significance: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001
Models show effects compared to whites. All models estimated with fixed effect for offense year
and the culpability scale as a covariate.

Of the twenty-four estimates in Table 6, twenty-two were statistically
significant, suggesting robust patterns of differential charging of aggravators
by defendant race.
These trends that cut across specific special
circumstances, suggesting that the architecture of California’s death penalty
statute may operate in a way to produce racial disparities. Within these
overall patterns, two specific trends emerge. First, for each special
circumstance, the results are nearly always consistent across the
comparisons of whites with either black, Latinx or both race and ethnic
groups. That is, there is little differentiation in the differences between these
two nonwhite groups. There are disparities for black defendants, Latinx
defendants, or the combined population of black and Latinx defendants.
Second, the patterns of discrimination vary by special circumstance. As
in the earlier analysis, white defendants are more likely to have the multiple
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victim homicides and torture special circumstances found or present in each
of the models.157 Other special circumstances also show patterns that reflect
race-specific crime patterns. Black defendants and Latinx defendants are
significantly more likely to have the robbery/burglary, drive-by shooting,
and gang factors found or present compared to each of the white defendants.
One could ask whether these patterns simply reflect the disparate
epidemiology of homicide by race in California in the specific homicide
categories. The analytic model that we used is designed to control for that
contingency. The model compares outcomes of charging decisions within
homicide category, controlling for covariates including defendant
culpability, to estimate whether the aggravator is more often found by
defendant race. Within categories that are racially skewed toward
nonwhites, such as robbery/burglary homicides or gang membership, we
still observe disparate treatment by race. In other words, these comparisons
are not frequentist based. They are comparative estimates within categories,
independent of the incidence of each homicide category. Accordingly, these
patterns suggest a disparity that seems to be instantiated into the statute’s
design and operation.
We tested the sensitivity of the estimates in Table 6 to the inclusion of
victim race, especially white victims. In previous studies, estimates of
charging and sentencing were sensitive to the inclusion of white victim
parameters, with consistent evidence of a greater probability of death
sentencing and charging in cases with white victims.158 This privileging of
white victim cases extends to police investigations of potentially capitaleligible murders.159 To test the sensitivity of the estimates in Table 6 to the
inclusion of white victim effects, we reestimated those regressions adding
that parameter. The results were nearly identical. Parameter estimates changed
only at the third decimal place, and significance remained unchanged.160

157. Unlike the findings presented in Table 5, however, this analysis also shows white
defendants have a higher rate of application to the lying-in-wait special circumstance.
Lying in wait describes a very broad special circumstance. Recall that the unadjusted
analyses did not find significant disparities in application rates. The tests in the Table 6
models differ in how they define and mathematically contrast nonwhite race or
ethnicity with whites. They eliminate the other race or ethnicity from each analysis. It
is not a surprise that the results vary depending on the statistical test and the varying
construction of the contrasting groups.
158. See Grosso et al., supra note 84.
159. Fagan & Geller, supra note 99 (reporting findings demonstrating that police clear cases
disparately by race).
160. Data available from the authors.
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The results overall confirm the heterogeneity of the application of
special circumstances, but the disparate treatment model suggests that race
and ethnicity affect charging. Given the volume of capital-eligible cases that
are racially skewed by homicide category or special circumstance,161 evidence
here of disparity and bias within the more frequent categories of robbery
and gang homicides suggests that the California statute itself invites
disparate treatment of black and Latinx defendants.162
CONCLUSION
After Furman, in 1977 California enacted a statute reinstating the death
penalty that attempted to identify those murders that are “particularly
serious or for which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate.”163 As with
others across the United States, this new law was intended to rationalize the
identification of those murders that merited a death sentence and, in so
doing, to guard against arbitrariness and caprice.164
Less than one year later, the drafters of the Briggs Initiative campaigned
with the promise to expand reach of California’s death penalty to “every
murderer.”165 Senator Briggs vilified the narrowing requirements in Furman
and sought language that was “as broad and inclusive as possible.”166 The
initiative knowingly expanded discretion and ignored any efforts to limit the
influence of race on capital punishment. It launched a trajectory through which
the California death penalty law has been expanded repeatedly over the course
of the last three decades, well beyond even the capacious Briggs Initiative.167

161. Fagan & Geller, supra note 99 (on race and clearance rates); Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E.
Zimring & Amanda Geller, Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market Share and
The Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (2006) (explaining the
importance of distinguishing homicide category when estimating the deterrent effect of
capital punishment).
162. This finding also counsels caution in interpreting models that examine nonspecial
circumstance-specific racial disparities. Such models may mask statistically significant
disparities by race and ethnicity. A rich analysis of racial and ethnic disparities can
only accurately identify disparities though a similar attention to disaggregation and
decomposition of death eligibility.
163. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring). The original
California statute can be found at 1977–78 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1977).
164. See Sharon, supra note 28, at 247 (discussing the purposes of the narrowing
requirement).
165. Declaration of Gerald F. Uelmen, supra note 47, at 7.
166. Declaration of Donald H. Heller, supra note 45, at 1–2.
167. See text accompanying notes 52–66; see also Simon & Spaulding, supra note 52.
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Opponents of the bills and voter initiatives expanding the California
statute regularly warned the California legislature and voters that “the
broader the cases that are eligible for the death penalty as punishment, the
greater the risk that the death penalty will be applied in an arbitrary and
unconstitutional manner.”168 Opponents even proposed legislation to
address anticipated racial discrimination to no avail.169 The 2000 expansion
of the states’ death penalty statute added homicides committed by alleged
gang members, a designation known to be deployed in a racially disparate
and notoriously imprecise manner.170
This Article shows the costs to equity of the continuous expansion.171
We found that individual special circumstances apply to defendants
disparately by race and ethnicity, even after controlling for case culpability,
victim race, and year. The statute appears to codify rather than ameliorate
the harmful racial stereotypes that are endemic to our criminal justice
system. The statutory expansions that made death-eligible cases involving
gang membership or a drive-by shooting apply overwhelmingly more
frequently in black and Latinx defendant cases. The largest disparities in
application concern the gang member special circumstance, added almost
two decades after California reintroduced capital punishment after Furman.
These special circumstances for gang membership and drive-by shootings
fulfill the predictions of previous scholars who raised concerns that they
would legislate “vengeance” rather than culpability and run a risk of being
“easy to apply to minority defendants.” To ignore that demographic reality
suggests a form of racial blindsight.
The 1977 California statute provides an interesting point of
comparison to the current state of death eligibility. Arguably, it attempted
to identify those special circumstances California would preserve as most
important for identifying the “particularly serious” murders at that time.
The 1977 statute included special circumstances for murder of multiple
168. See, e.g., Senate Committee Bill Analysis, Senate Bill 32 (Mar. 7, 1995) (citing opposition
submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union), http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/9596/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_32_cfa_950221_155939_sen_comm.html
[https://perma.cc/DD35-K64X].
169. See, e.g., ACLU, Proposed Amendments to Senate Bill 32 (Mar. 6, 1995).
170. See supra note 64 (collecting sources).
171. Given the demography of murder, and especially these types of murder, any expansion
of the death penalty is likely to aggravate the problem of racial equity in the death
penalty. Anthony V. Alfieri, Objecting to Race, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1129 (2014);
Jeffrey Fagan & Mukul Bakhshi, New Frameworks for Racial Equality in the Criminal
Law, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2007); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity
of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2007).
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victims, murder with torture, or murder of a peace officer or a witness,
circumstances that aligned with most of the post-Furman death statutes
across the death penalty states. Notably, it did not include gang membership
or drive-by shooting. What about these newer special circumstances
identifies a murder that is more dangerous or reprehensible than any other?
This Article also refocuses attention on the cost, in terms of equity, of
reliance on felony murder.172 Adjusted and unadjusted analyses document that
the combined felony-murder special circumstance for robbery and burglary
applies disproportionately in black and Latinx defendant cases. Steven Shatz
previously questioned the constitutionality of “making death-eligible ordinary
robbery-burglary murderers.”173 He noted, “They are, in every respect, the
‘average’ murderers whose culpability ‘is insufficient to justify the most extreme
sanction available to the State.’”174 In contrast, the special circumstances for
multiple murders and for torture murder, both of which apply
disproportionately to white defendant cases, ascribe culpability to objective facts
about the murder itself—facts frequently associated with the worst of the worst.
Rather than mitigating the influence of race, the overly broad
California death penalty statute seems to have fulfilled the predictions of
scholars and civil rights activists by incorporating racial stereotypes or at
least furthering them, and perhaps giving them a veneer of legitimacy. This
Article brings the anticipated disparities to the surface. The instantiation of racial
and ethnic stereotypes into death eligibility raises the specter or discriminatory
application in the design of California’s statute, with implications for
constitutional regulation of capital punishment.

172. See generally Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and Ordinary
Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REV. 719 (2007)
(reporting findings concerning felony murders in California).
173. Id. at 770.
174. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).

